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COMMENT/Death on State Waters-The Unsinkable
Doctrine of Lex Loci
The traditional choice of law rule, embodied in the original
Restatement of Conflict of Laws (§ 384), and until recently unques-
tioningly followed in this court . .. has been that the substantive
rights and liabilities arising out of a tortious occurrence are deter-
minable by the law of the place of the tort .... It had its conceptual
foundation in the vested rights doctrine, namely, that a right to re-
cover for a foreign tort owes its creation to the law of the jurisdiction
where the injury occurred and depends for its existence and extent
solely on such law.... [T]he vested rights doctrine has long since been
discredited. . . . More particularly, as applied to torts, the theory
ignores the interest which jurisdictions other than that where the tort
occurred may have in the resolution of particular issues. It is for
this very reason that, despite the advantages of certainty, ease of ap-
plication and predictability which it affords . .. there has in recent
years been increasing criticism of the traditional rule by commenta-
tors and a judicial trend towards its abandonment or modification.'
Death by wrongful act actions, arising from a tort committed on the terri-
torial waters of a state, are not immune from the present dissatisfaction with
the traditional choice of law rule of the "place of the injury." Yet courts
have refused to recognize the recent trend in conflict of laws when dealing
with a maritime tort on state waters which results in death. This refusal has
created an anomalous situation whereby it is possible to obtain two com-
pletely different results in death actions arising out of torts committed within
the same state, merely because one occurred on land and the other upon the
state's territorial waters.
The purpose of this comment is to review the law applicable to death
actions arising from torts committed on a state's territorial waters and to
consider directly the conflict of laws problem mentioned above.
1. Judge Fuld in Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 475, 191 N.EX2d 279, 281, 240 N.Y.S.2d
743, 746-47 (1963).
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I. Historical Development of Maritime Death Actions
The action for wrongful death in admiralty has had a long and tortuous
history in the United States. As in the common law,2 the death of a human
being, although involving pecuniary loss, was not a ground for an action for
damages; the right of action died with the injured party.3 The United States
Supreme Court held in The Harrisburg,4 after an extensive review of the
cases, that no suit for wrongful death would lie "in the courts of the United
States under general maritime law."5 However, an action would lie if pro-
vided by a state statute.6 In 1872, in reviewing a state court decision for
wrongful death resulting from injuries sustained on navigable waters brought
under the "saving" clause, 7 the Court stated:
Where no remedy exists for an injury in the admiralty courts the
fact that such courts exist and exercise jurisdiction in other causes of
action leaves the State courts as free to exercise jurisdiction in re-
spect to an injury not cognizable in the admiralty as if the admiralty
courts were unknown to the Constitution and had no existence in
our jurisprudence.
8
The La Bourgogne9 sustained a claim for wrongful death occurring on the
high seas as maintainable in limitation proceedings pending in a federal
admiralty court since French law (the ship had a French registry) provided
for such an action. This holding was essentially a generalization of the ration-
ale of The HamiltonlO-wrongful death claims were cognizable in admiralty
in federal court limitation proceedings, where the law of both ships (Dela-
ware) involved in a collision on the high seas countenanced wrongful death
suits. Thus, revival of tort actions was recognized in admiralty, even though
revival was not an accepted maritime doctrine, because it existed outside
admiralty." Hence, the Court, in Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia,12 deemed it to
be the logical consequence of prior decisions that where death "results from
2. See, e.g., Insurance Co. v. Brame, 95 U.S. 754, 756 (1877). For early decisions stating
that the wrongful death was cognizable at common law, see cases collected in Annot., 1916A
L.R.A. 1157 n.4.
3. Insurance Co. v. Brame, supra note 2, at 757.
4. 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
5. Id. at 213.
6. Ibid.; Sherlock v. Alling, 98 U.S. 99 (1876) (applying the Indiana statute to a death
occurring on the Ohio River opposite the mainland of Indiana); Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia,
257 U.S. 233 (1921) (applying the California statute).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1) (1964). Although the Congress has conferred exclusive jurisdiction
on the federal district courts in cases arising in admiralty, all other remedies were "saved"
to suitors where the common law was competent to give it. For a more complete discussion
of this point, see text infra at notes 37-41.
8. Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 522, 530 (1872).
9. 210 U.S. 95 (1908).
10. 207 U.S. 398 (1907).
11. See cases cited supra notes 4-10.
12. 257 U.S. 233 (1921).
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a maritime tort committed on navigable waters within a State whose statutes
give a right of action on account of death by wrongful act, the admiralty
courts will entertain a libel in personam for the damages sustained by those
to whom such right is given."'8 Judge Learned Hand attempted to give
theoretical breadth to this concept in The James McGee14 by extending the
flag analysis to allow recovery in a collision case for the death of one aboard
a ship, the law of which did not grant a wrongful death action, where the
state law governing the second ship, which was at fault, did allow a right of
action. Judge Hand discarded the approach of The Hamilton, i.e., that re-
covery depended on the idea that a ship was the extension of the territory of
its sovereign, and grounded the result on the legislative power of the sover-
eign of the forum to impose obligation and liability as a part of its conflict of
laws.
In 1920, Congress enacted the federal Death on the High Seas Act
(DOHSA),15 which provided a remedy for death occurring on the high seas.
Irrespective of whether death occurred on the high seas or on territorial waters
of a state subject to admiralty jurisdiction, the Jones Act of 191516 gave a
remedy for the death of a seaman resulting from injuries received in the
course of employment. This statute was held to supersede the application of
all the state statutes. 17 The federal statutes thus give a remedy for the death of
anyone resulting from a tort committed on the high seas, and for the death
of seamen whether the tort be on high seas or on territorial waters.' 8 The
statutes do not, however, provide for the situation where the death of one
not covered by the Jones Act, i.e., a non-seaman, results from a maritime tort
committed on the territorial waters of a state.
19
II. Jurisdiction of Federal and State Courts
While general maritime law, like the common law, gives no right of action
for a wrongful death, it is well settled that an action in personam for wrong-
ful death, resulting from a maritime tort committed on the territorial waters
of a state, will be entertained by an appropriate court, federal20 or state,21 when
13. Id. at 242.
14. 300 F. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
15. Death on the High Seas Act, ch. 111, 41 Stat. 537-38 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-67 (1964).
16. Jones Act § 20, 38 Stat. 1185 (1915), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
17. See Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S. 38, 44 (1930).
18. E.g., McKie v. Diamond Marine Co., 204 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1953).
19. The Jones Act pertains only to seamen. See Young v. Clyde S.S. Co., 294 F. 549 (S.D. Fla.
1923). The Death on the High Seas Act can be invoked only when the tort occurred on the
high seas. See, e.g., Middleton v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 70 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1934), cert. denied,
293 U.S. 577 (1934); Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383 (1941).
20. E.g., Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, supra note 12; American Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello,
330 U.S. 446 (1947); Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648 (1953); The Tungus v. Skovgaard,
358 U.S. 588 (1959); Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314 (1960).
21. See, e.g., Warren v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co., 235 N.Y. 445, 139 N.E. 569, cert.
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a statute of the state gives such a right of action.22 The action may be brought
either in admiralty or at law;23 and if the action is at law, it may be brought in
either a state or federal court.2 4 Courts of admiralty, when assuming juris-
diction in a death case, do not enforce a right of action existing under the
general maritime law, but rather enforce a right created by a state statute
which supplements the maritime law in respect to torts committed upon
local waters.
25
The jurisdiction of the federal district courts to entertain a death action
based on a state statute is grounded on the admiralty jurisdiction of the feder-
al courts20 or on diversity of citizenship,27 but not on their jurisdiction over
controversies arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States.
28
If the action is one at law, the requirements of diversity and amount in con-
troversy must be met before the federal court has jurisdiction.
29
Even though federal admiralty courts have exclusive jurisdiction of all
maritime claims in rem,30 state courts may have concurrent jurisdiction of in
personam maritime claims.8 '
Admiralty Jurisdiction
The Constitution of the United States provides in Article 3, Section 2, that
the judicial power of the United States shall extend "to all cases of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction." Title 28, United States Code, Section 1333, pro-
vides the federal district courts with original jurisdiction, exclusive of state
courts, of all civil cases of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, "saving to
suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled."
denied, 262 U.S. 756 (1923); Roswall v. Grays Harbor Stevedore Co., 132 Wash. 274, 231 P.
934 (1925).
22. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 229 (1958).
23. 1 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 32, at 179 (rev. ed.
1960).
24. O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36 (1943).
25. Warren v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co., supra note 21, at 446, 139 N.E. at 569.
26. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1964).
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 82 (1821) (holding
that the subject of controversy is immaterial in that class of cases in which jurisdiction is
based on diversity of citizenship); Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U.S. 10 (1875) (holding that the
Constitution places no limitation on those cases based on diversity of citizenship); Mary-
land Cas. Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409 (1954) (holding that where there is diversity in an
action based on a maritime tort, it was not necessary to plead the Jones Act as a basis for
jurisdiction).
28. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
29. 1 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, supra note 23, at 179. In such a case the only basis for
jurisdiction could be diversity and then, of course, the usual requirements must be met
in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964).
30. Bloom v. Furness-Withy & Co., 293 F. 98 (S.D. Cal. 1923).
31. Steamboat Co. v. Chase, supra note 8. See also Sherlock v. Ailing, supra note 6
(affirming a judgment of the Supreme Court of Indiana in favor of a plaintiff in an action
under the wrongful death statute of Indiana, for a death occurring on its territorial wa-
ters); cases collected in Annot., 71 A.L.R.2d 1296, 1308n.1 (1960).
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From these provisions, it is clear that if there is a remedy in admiralty for
wrongful death, a federal admiralty court has jurisdiction of the death action
resulting from a maritime tort committed on the territorial waters of a state.
2
Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction
An action based on a maritime tort may also be entertained on the law side
of a federal district court.83 In a death action, however, where the state statute
specifically deals with ships and provides for a libel in rem against the ship
and a libel in personam against the owners or those responsible for the tort,
it has been held that such an action is primarily maritime in nature and
must be brought in admiralty.
8 4
It should be noted, however, that maritime claims are not cognizable in
federal courts when jurisdiction is based on the "federal question" jurisdic-
tion of the district courts. In this regard, it was held in Turner v. Wilson
Line, Inc.,35 that an action for death occurring on the navigable waters of
Massachusetts was not one arising under the Constitution or laws of the
United States. The court observed that the plaintiff's cause of action was one
arising under Massachusetts law, which provided both the right to recover
and the scope of the remedy.
3 6
State Court Jurisdiction
Although within the jurisdiction of federal admiralty courts, death actions
arising from a tort on state waters are also maintainable in the state courts
under the pertinent state death statute.37 This concurrent jurisdiction is
authorized by the "saving clause" of Title 28, United States Code, Section
1333 (1), but is derived from a provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789.
38 In
conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the federal courts in all civil cases of ad-
miralty, Congress fittingly saved to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common
law remedy where the common law was competent to give it.s9 This was inter-
preted to mean that the remedy or right of action was saved in those courts
which proceeded according to the common law, as distinguished from those
proceeding in admiralty. 40 This is not to say that only those rights and reme-
dies cognizable in the common law prior to 1789, when the first clause was
32. See Hess v. United States, supra note 20.
33. Cases cited supra note 27.
34. Young v. Clyde S.S. Co., supra note 19. But see Bigelow v. Nickerson, 70 F. 113 (7th
Cir. 1895).
35. 242 F.2d 414 (1st Cir. 1957).
36. Id. at 418. See also Beck v. Johnson, 169 F. 154 (W.D. Ky. 1909).
37. See case cited supra note 31.
38. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 76.
39. E.g., Perry v. Stanfield, 278 Mass. 563, 180 N.E. 514 (1932); Billings v. Breinig, 45
Mich. 65, 7 N.W. 722 (1881).
40. Steamboat Co. v. Chase, supra note 8.
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adopted, are "saved." 4' The Supreme Court, in Steamboat Co. v. Chase,42
held that it was immaterial that the death action was not known to the com-
mon law at the time of the passage of the Judiciary Act. A federal court, in
O'Leary v. United States Lines Co.,48 stated: "[I]t has long been settled that
a state-created remedy for wrongful death will be enforced both in the ad-
miralty courts and in proceedings under the saving clause when death re-
sults from a tort committed on navigable waters within a state whose statute
provides such a remedy."
44
Thus, an action for wrongful death upon a state's territorial waters is cogni-
zable in a federal admiralty court, a federal court upon diversity of citizen-
ship grounds, or a state court. This then presents the question: What law,
federal or state, are these courts to apply?
III. What Law Controls?
The doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,45 under which a federal court in
a diversity case is bound to follow the law of the state in which the court is
sitting, is considered to be inapplicable in maritime cases. 46 It is said that
when an admiralty court enforces an obligation created by a state statute, it
enforces it as it would a statute originating in any foreign jurisdiction.
47
Today, it has become settled law that when a federal court adopts a state's
right of action for wrongful death, it must enforce the right as an integrated
whole, with whatever conditions and limitations the state creating it has
attached.48 There is impressive authority supporting the proposition that one
who seeks to recover under a state wrongful death statute for a tort occurring
on the navigable waters of a state may do so only in accordance with the sub-
stantive law of the state.49 In fact, it would seem that cases which hold that
41. Panama R.R. v. Vasquez, 271 U.S. 557 (1926); Johnson v. Westerfield's Adm'r, 143
Ky. 10, 135 S.W. 425 (1911).
42. Supra note 8.
43. 215 F.2d 708 (lst Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 939 (1955).
44. Id. at 711.
45. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
46. Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648 (1953).
47. Id. at 651; The Tungus v. Skovgaard, supra note 20; Hess v. United States, supra
note 20.
48. See The Tungus v. Skovgaard, supra note 20; Lee v. Pure Oil Co., 218 F.2d 711 (6th
Cir. 1955); Continental Cas. Co. v. The Benny Skou, 200 F.2d 246 (4th Cir. 1952), cert.
denied, 345 U.S. 992 (1953) (holding, in an action for the death of a stevedore loading
cargo in a Virginia harbor, that a plaintiff grounding his action on a state wrongful death
statute must accept it as construed by the highest court of the state).
49. See, e.g., Feige v. Hurley, 89 F.2d 575 (6th Cir. 1937) (an action under the Kentucky
statute, in which it was held that such a right is enforced in admiralty according to the
common law and contributory negligence is a bar to recovery unless it has been abolished
by statute); Klingseisen v. Costanzo Transp. Co., 101 F.2d 902 (3d Cir. 1939) (recognizing
rule when applying the Pennsylvania statute); The H.S., Inc., 130 F.2d 341 (3d Cir. 1942)
(holding the New Jersey master-servant law was applicable when suing under the New Jersey
wrongful death statute); Puleo v. H. E. Moss & Co., 159 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1947) (under New
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general maritime law provides the substantive law and the state statute pro-
vides the remedy in actions for wrongful death on state territorial waters can
no longer be regarded as authority.50
When the action is brought in a state court, the court may interpret the
controlling statute as incorporating the substantive principles of maritime
law, but the question remains: Is it bound to do so? According to The Tun-
gus v. Skovgaard,51 the state court may reject the principles of maritime law
and apply its own substantive principles. This doctrine was greatly substan-
tiated in the later case of Goett v. Union Carbide Corp.,52 where the Court
specifically stated that the state court might apply its own substantive law
applicable to the statute invoked or it might incorporate the general mar-
itime concepts of unseaworthiness or negligence. Even prior to The Tungus,
state courts had held that where state wrongful death statutes were invoked,
the rights of the parties were to be determined by state substantive law.53
Among the questions of substantive law which have been held to be govern-
ed by state law are questions concerning the negligence of the tortfeasor,
54
the availability of the doctrine of seaworthiness, 55 the measure of damages, 56
the availability of the defense of contributory negligence as a complete bar
to recovery,57 and the question whether time limitations or laches bars
recovery.
58
Actions for wrongful death resulting from torts committed on a state's
territorial waters may be maintained in either a federal court-in admiralty
or at law, based upon diversity-or a state court, by virtue of the saving clause
-under the pertinent state death statute. The current decisions hold that
York law, owner of tanker owed employee same duty which it would have owed to him had
he entered owner's factory or shop to make repairs); Continental Cas. Co. v. The Benny
Skou, supra note 48.
50. For cases whose validity is now questioned, see, e.g., Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.
v. Kierejewski, 261 U.S. 479 (1923); O'Leary v. United States Lines Co., supra note 43;
The Devona, 1 F.2d 482 (1st Cir. 1924).
51. 358 U.S. 588, 590-91 (1959) (holding that the doctrine of unseaworthiness was en-
compassed by the New Jersey death statute).
52. 361 U.S. 340, 341-44 (1960).
53. Roswall v. Grays Harbor Stevedore Co., supra note 21 (action under the Washington
death statute). But see Riley v. Agwilines, Inc., 296 N.Y. 402, 73 N.E.2d 718 (1947) (rely-
ing on Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Dahl, 266 U.S. 449 (1925), an injury case).
54. Goett v. Union Carbide Corp., supra note 52; Pulco v. H. E. Moss & Co., supra note
49; Cromartie v. Stone, 194 N.C. 663, 140 S.E. 612 (1927).
55. The Tungus v. Skovgaard, supra note 51; cases collected in Annot., 71 A.L.R.2d
1296, 1317 n.18 (1960).
56. Quinette v. Bisso, 136 F. 825 (5th Cir. 1905), cert. denied, 199 U.S. 606 (1905).
57. Halecki v. United New York & N.J.S.H.P. Ass'n, 251 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1958), vacated
on other grounds, 358 U.S. 613 (1959); cases collected in Annot., 71 A.L.R.2d 1296, 1319
n.2 (1960).
58. The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886); Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, supra note 12;
Levinson v. Deupree, supra note 46: cases collected in Annot., 71 A.L.R.2d 1296, 1322 n.6
(1960).
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when a state statute is used, the rights of the parties are determined by the
substantive state law applicable to that statute. General maritime law prin-
ciples are employed only where the controlling statute can be interpreted as
incorporating them.
IV. The Conflict of Laws Problem
The nature and importance of this question is clearly manifested in the re-
cent case of Scott v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.59 This was an action arising out
of the crash of an Eastern Air Lines plane into the navigable waters of Bos-
ton harbor after its takeoff from Boston's Logan Airport. The flight was to
terminate at Atlanta, Georgia, with its first stop at Philadelphia. Plaintiff's
decedent, who was killed in the crash, was a resident of Pennsylvania and
was returning home on the flight. Suit was brought on the law side of the
federal District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. That court
refused the defendant's request for an instruction to the effect that the nature
and extent of plaintiff's recovery should be determined in accordance with
the provisions of Massachusetts law.6 0 At that time, the Massachusetts statutes
limited damages to a maximum of $20,000; however, the Pennsylvania stat-
utes6' authorized recovery of the present worth of the anticipated value of
the decedent's estate as it would be valued at the end of a normal life span.
The jury was allowed to determine damages in accordance with the Pennsyl-
vania statutes. The district court's ruling was challenged on appeal, and the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that Massachusetts
law applied. This was so, said the court, because the wrongful death action
was for a maritime tort; a maritime tort action is governed by general mari-
time law; the maritime conflict of laws rule for wrongful death actions is
simple-apply the law of the place of the tort. The accident occurred in
Massachusetts, therefore, Massachusetts law applied.62
To buttress its holding, the court stated: "The maritime law will accord
dependents and survivors rights of recovery neither more nor less extensive
than they would enjoy under the law of the state within whose territorial
waters the fatal maritime tort occurred."'68 In support of this proposition, the
court cited Hess v. United States,6 4 The Tungus v. Skovgaard,65 Western
Fuel Co. v. Garcia,66 and The H. S., Inc.67 Yet, in none of these cases, was the
court faced with the choice of applying one state death statute over another.
59. No. 16328 (3d Cir., March 30, 1967).
60. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 228, § 1(2) and ch. 229, § 2 (1958).
61. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1601-04 (1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 320.601 (1950).
62. Scott v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., supra note 59, at 5.
63. Id. at 4.
64. 361 U.S. 314 (1960).
65. 358 U.S. 588 (1959).
66. 257 U.S. 233 (1921).
67. 130 F.2d 341 (3d Cir. 1942).
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In each case, the issue pertaining to state law was whether to apply the sub-
stantive law of the particular state or federal maritime law. After an exten-
sive review of the cases, it appears that the Supreme Court has never directly
faced the question of which state statute to apply where there were two or
more statutes pleaded or brought before the court. It seems that the Court
has always assumed, without actually deciding, that the appropriate statute
was that of the state within whose territory the tort occurred. 8
Lower federal courts, when deciding survival of tort actions arising out of
maritime torts, have not always applied the law of the place of the tort. The
courts have sustained survival actions where they were permitted by the law
of the tortfeasant-shipowner's domicile,69 or the domicile of the tortfeasor,
even though he was not the shipowner or operator. 70 These actions have also
been sustained where permitted by the law of the forum, at least where the
alleged tortfeasor had substantial contacts with the forum,71 and where sur-
vival was the law of a forum that would have been available to claimants had
they not become parties in a limitation proceeding in another forum.72
Apparently the rule of "place of the tort" enunciated by the court in Scott
finds its basis in the age-old conflict of laws rule of torts. In general, this is
still the principle held to by a majority of the courts.7 However, a trend has
developed under which the plaintiff, depending upon his "contacts" with the
forum,74 is allowed to sue and recover there, applying forum law, despite the
fact he would have lost, or his recovery would have been greatly limited, had
he sued in the state where the accident took place.75
One of the states following this trend is Pennsylvania. The Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania, reviewing an action for wrongful death of one of its domi-
68. See cases cited supra notes 6, 8, 20 and 64-67.
69. United States v. The S.S. Washington, 172 F. Supp. 905 (E.D. Va.), afjd, upon opin-
ion below, sub nom. United States v. Texas Co., 272 F.2d 711 (4th Cir. 1959); In re Gulf
Oil Corp., 172 F. Supp. 911 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
70. Abbott v. United States, 207 F. Supp. 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
71. Williams v. Moran, 205 F. Supp. 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
72. In re Gulf Oil Corp., supra note 69. See also Safir v. Compagnie Generale Transat-
lantique, 241 F. Supp. 501 (E.D.N.Y. 1965) (holding that the New York death statute could
be applied extra-territorially to a tort committed on the high seas, notwithstanding the fed-
eral statute).
73. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962).
74. Although most writers are opposed to the retention of the place of the tort rule,
there is disagreement as to its successor. Some favor the law of the forum: See, e.g., Currie,
in Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM.
L. REV. 1212, 1233 (1963); A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICr OF LAws § 122 (1962); Comment, The
Second Conflicts Restatement of Torts: A Caveat, 51 CALIF. L. REv. 762, 769-82 (1963).
Others favor the "most significant contacts" doctrine: See, e.g., Cheatham, in Comments
on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, supra at 1229; Reese,
Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 679 (1963).
75. See Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication Versus Automation in the Conflict
of Laws, 10 STAN. L. REV. 205 (1958). See, e.g., George v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 332 F.2d
73 (2d Cir. 1964); Lowe's North Wilkesboro Hardware, Inc. v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
319 F.2d 469 (4th Cir. 1963); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.
2d 743 (1963).
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ciliaries arising out of a plane crash in Colorado, held that the Pennsylvania
wrongful death statute was applicable.7 6 After a thorough discussion of the
current trend the court concluded:
Pennsylvania's interest in the amount of recovery .. .is great.
The relationship between the decedent and United was entered
into in Pennsylvania. Our Commonwealth, the domicile of the de-
cedent and his family, is vitally concerned with the administration
of decedent's estate and the well-being of the surviving dependents
to the extent of granting full recovery . . .
The United States Supreme Court, in Richards v. United States,78 has
favorably acknowledged this recent tendency to depart from the place-of-the-
injury rule in an action under the federal Tort Claims Act,7 9 which provides
that the Government shall be liable for tortious conduct committed by its
employees acting within the scope of their employment "under circumstances
where the United States ... would be liable to the claimant in accordance with
the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 80 In Richards, the
Tort Claims Act, considered alone, would have made the Oklahoma death
statute applicable. However, in applying the "whole" law of Oklahoma, the
Court agreed with the district court and the court of appeals, that the Okla-
homa conflicts rule precluded the application of Oklahoma law, because
Oklahoma was not the state where the injury occurred as was required by
that rule. The Court did state, however, that had the Oklahoma conflict of
laws rule allowed the application of law other than that of the place of the
injury, it would have been permissible to apply it.
In light of the recent cases, and especially the Supreme Court's favorable
attitude toward the new choice of law doctrines, it is quite likely that the
traditional rule of the place-of-the-tort will soon be discarded.
V. Conclusion
The new choice of law doctrines can and should be applied in death actions
arising from maritime torts committed on the navigable waters of a state.
If the traditional rule is, in fact, the settled law, as the court in Scott held it
to be, it should be discarded and replaced with a rule which gives deference
to the legitimate interests of the state of the plaintiff's domicile.
The action for wrongful death arising from a tort occurring on a state's
territorial waters is not the typical admiralty action and is not subject to the
arguments usually made for the application of general maritime law. The
76. Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
77. Id. at 10, 203 A.2d at 807.
78. Supra note 73, at 12-13.
79. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2411, 2412 & 2677-80 (1964).
80. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b) (1964).
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Comments
Scott court attempted to substantiate its decision by observing that the mari-
time law was national law and that "its principles should, to the best of
judicial ability, be recognized and applied uniformly." 8' Yet, how can there
be uniformity when 50 state statutes, each with its own peculiarities, are
applied, depending upon the place where the tort was committed? There can
be no uniformity in this area without a federal death statute or a uniform
wrongful death act.
The legislative history of the federal Death on the High Seas Act is
particularly pertinent here. It discloses a clear Congressional intent to leave
"unimpaired the rights under State statutes as to deaths on waters within the
territorial jurisdiction of the States."8 2 The record of debate in the House of
Representatives preceding passage of DOHSA reflects deep concern that the
power of the states to create actions for wrongful death in no way be affected
by enactments of federal law.88 What can be more crucial to the states than
how and when their death statutes are to be applied? To be sure, Congress'
expressed intent as to legislation must extend to judicial decisions also.
If state statutes are applied and state substantive law is applied, why
should not state conflicts rules be applied? To the state, what can be of more
substance than the question: When is its own statute to be employed?
81. Scott v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., supra note 59, at 5.
82. S. REP. No. 216, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1919); H.R. REP. No. 674, 66th Cong., 1st
Sess. 3 (1919).
83. 59 CONG. REc. 4482-86 (1920).
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